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Abstract 
 
After the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, low-income countries in 
transition: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan have faced challenges of widespread poverty and sharp inequality. 
To reduce poverty and inequality, this group of countries, also known as CIS-7, 
has committed to rapid reforms in social assistance programs. This article 
proposes a new Common Framework of Performance Measurement for social 
assistance programs in CIS-7 countries that allows social administrators and 
policymakers to assess the performance of social assistance programs for the 
purposes of management improvement, encouraging accountability, and 
promoting benchmarking. Combining efficiency, quality, and effectiveness 
perspectives into a framework is a practical approach to assess the 
achievements of social assistance programs in CIS-7 towards poverty and 
inequality reduction. 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the former republics of 
the Union have launched reforms in social assistance programs, adjusting them 
to the requirements of the market economy. The reforms are especially painful 
and slow in the seven poorest countries of the former Soviet Union: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the so-
called Commonwealth Independent States - 7 (CIS-7). After 15 years of reform, 
social assistance in the CIS-7 countries is still inadequate. Widespread poverty 
and sharp inequality are increasing the demand for social assistance (SA), while 
fiscal constraints and limited administrative capacities are hindering reforms 
(Braithwaite, Grootaert, & Milanovich, 2000; Dobronogov, 2003; EBRD, 2003; 
Fox, 2003; World Bank, 2000a, 2004). Recently, CIS-7 governments have 
officially committed to drastic reforms in the area of social assistance (see GoAr, 
2003; GoAz, 2003; GoG, 2003; GoK, 2003; GoM, 2003; GoT, 2002), which has 
created the need to measure and compare the performance of reformed SA 
programs, as well as to provide the societies in CIS-7 countries with information 
about reforms to increase government accountability. 
Scholarship focusing on measuring performance of social programs has 
been prolific in recent years. Numerous articles and monographs on the topic 
portray an increasing interest in models assessing performance of social 
Habibov and Fan   
Currents: New Scholarship in Human Service 
Volume 6, Number 1, 2007 
2 
programs and several models   assessing social programs have already been 
developed (Heintzmann, Canagarajah, & Holzmann, 2001; ILO, 1999; IMF, 
2001; World Bank, 2002a).  However valuable and useful these models are, for 
several reasons, they are not usually suitable for assessing performance of 
social assistance in the CIS-7. Existing models are often not appropriate to 
assess social programs in low-income countries in transition, that face very 
specific challenges in development. They are rather general and are not 
elaborate enough to focus on specific social assistance interventions. Further, 
they are not detailed enough to assess all dimensions of social assistance 
programs. For example, the quality dimension is usually overlooked. The goal of 
this article is to propose a common framework of performance measurement to 
assess, compare, and contrast performance of social assistance programs in 
CIS-7 governments. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, the paper 
reviews the needs for comprehensive reforms in social assistance in the CIS-7, 
and challenges in their implementation. Second, the paper makes a case to 
move toward a common framework of performance measurement in social 
assistance by providing rationale for its development. Third, the paper describes 
and discusses how such a system might look, how the data for the framework 
would be available, and who should be responsible for data analysis. The major 
contention of this article is that common framework of performance 
measurement is a useful approach to monitor and assess social assistance 
programs in the CIS-7. The introduction of this framework will lead to improving 
design and implementation of social assistance in the poorest countries of the 
former Soviet Union. 
 
Poverty in CIS-7 Countries 
 
Poverty is a multifaceted concept and could be measured in different ways 
(Coudouel, Hentschel & Wodon, 2003). In this section of the paper we employ 
several measures of poverty, namely, poverty rate, poverty gap, and poverty 
severity, to illustrate evolution of poverty in CIS-7 countries in Table 1.  
Poverty rate is the most common measurement of poverty that shows the 
proportion of the total population living below the poverty line. Another measure 
of poverty, poverty gap, indicates the proportion of additional income needed to 
lift a population up to the poverty line. Finally, poverty severity shows inequality 
within the poor by placing higher weight for the poorest of the poor. Selected 
measures of poverty expose different aspects of monetary poverty, which 
complement each other in helping to assess different facets of poverty. 
Poverty did exist in the former Soviet Union but even at that time it was 
more widespread in the CIS-7 republics as compared with other republics of the 
Union and the Union as a whole, as shown in column 1 of Table 1. It is 
estimated that in 1988, three years before dissolution of the former Soviet 
Union, about 11 percent of the total population of the country lived below the 
poverty line, while the number of poor for CIS-7 republics now exceeds 28 
percent in average. 
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Table 1: Growth of poverty in CIS-7 countries during transition 
 
 
 
Poverty 
rate 
1989 
(%)1 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
Poverty 
rate 
1999-
2001 
(%)2 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Poverty 
gap 
1999-
20012 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Poverty 
severity 
1999-
20012 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
% of total 
population 
below 
extreme 
poverty 
line3 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
Number 
of people 
living 
below 
extreme 
poverty 
line3 
(million) 
 
(6) 
 
Real 
GDP 
2000/
1990 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) 
 
Real 
formal 
wage 
1999/
1990 
 
 
 
 
(8) 
 
Armenia 14.3 47.4 .155 .061 43.5 1,652 .63 .11 
Azerbaijan 33.6 49.6 .155 .067 23.5 1,686 .50 .36 
Georgia 13.0 23.1 .075 .036 18.9 1,021 .25 .06 
Kyrgyzstan 32.9 56.4 .172 .070 49.1 2,360 .59 .45 
Moldova 11.0 62.3 .241 .121 55.4 2,022 .36 .23 
Tajikistan 51.2 95.7 .574 .379 68.3 4,099 .33 .01 
Uzbekistan 43.6 27.5 N/A N/A N/A 2,233 .79 1.32 
Average 
CIS-7 28.5 51.7 .229 .122   .49 .36 
Average 
other 
republics of 
CIS4 13.0        
Average of 
former 
Baltic 
Republics5 2.2        
Average of 
former 
USSR 11.0        
Notes: 1Poverty rates in 1989 are defined as percentage of total population with income 
below 75 Rubles; 2 Poverty rate, gap, and severity for 1999-2001 are based on the national 
subsistence minimum for the respective countries; 3 Extreme poverty line is defined as 2.15 
USD PPP/day; 4 Other republics of CIS include: Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan and 
Ukraine; 5The former Baltic republics include: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. N/A means 
data are not available. Sources: Dobronogov (2003), Falkingham (2003, 2004) and 
calculations of authors. 
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The collapse of inter-republican trade and co-operation, and the 
dismantling of a highly centralized planned economy in the early part of the 
1990s, led to a severe economic depression that was more acute in CIS-7 
countries than the Great Depression in the US in the 1920-1930s (Milanovich, 
1998). As a result, real GDP and real wages in CIS-7 dropped drastically in 
comparison with the Soviet era (see columns 7 and 8). Economic depression 
negatively affected the living standards of the population. The degree of 
impoverishment in CIS-7 countries as exhibited by poverty rate, poverty gap, 
and poverty severity is shown in columns 2, 3 and 4. As these figures 
demonstrate, poverty increased in CIS-7 during the 1990s, in comparison with 
standards under the Soviet regime. Importantly, a significant number of people 
in the CIS-7 are living in extreme poverty by international standards (see 
columns 5 and 6). 
 
Inequality in CIS-7 Countries 
 
Increase in poverty in the countries of CIS-7 was accompanied by a sharp 
increase in inequality. In Table 2 we employ the Gini coefficient to examine 
evolution of inequality in CIS-7 countries in comparison with other countries of 
the former USSR.  
The Gini coefficient, perhaps the most popular measure of income 
inequality, is a summary indicator of inequality measured from 0 to 1. In a 
situation of complete inequality, when all income is distributed to a single 
person, the Gini coefficient takes a maximum value of 1. Conversely, in a 
situation of complete equality, when all income is distributed equally across the 
population, the Gini coefficient takes a minimum value of 0. The Gini coefficient 
for income reports inequality in the total income of a population, while the Gini 
coefficient for earnings reports inequality in the earnings of a population. 
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 2 show that Soviet society was fairly egalitarian, 
as demonstrated by low Gini coefficients in 1987-90. The centrally-planned 
economy controlled both wages (which were very compressed) and consumer 
prices (which were heavily subsidized). Moreover, state-run enterprises provided 
to all employees a number of in-kind benefits: free or subsidized health and day 
care, food, housing, and transportation. After the introduction of market 
principles in the economy, wages were decompressed, price subsidies were 
abolished and former state-run enterprises (which reemerged as private profit-
oriented business) tended to cease delivery of in-kind benefits to their 
employees. These changes led to the abrupt growth of inequality in the CIS-7 as 
is indicated by significant increase in Gini coefficients in the end of the 1990s, 
compared to the last years under the USSR (see columns 2 and 4). 
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For multiple reasons, inequality has an especially negative impact on low-
income countries in transition. First, in CIS-7 countries the speed of transition 
from egalitarianism to a rapid rise in inequality was shocking and overwhelming 
for the majority of the population. People who were accustomed to living in an 
egalitarian society for the last 70 years were shocked by sky-rocketing inequality 
that became sharper than that in the US, the western country with one of the 
highest levels of inequality (Redmond,  Schnepf & Suhrcke, 2002). Second, 
people in transitional countries are not ready to tolerate this high level of 
inequality and often argue for stronger government intervention to re-distribute 
income (Suhrcke, 2001). Lastly, higher inequality hinders poverty reduction 
through economic development. In a society with high-level inequality, only a 
Table 2: Growth of inequality in CIS-7 countries during transition 
 
 
The Gini 
coefficient 
for income 
1987-1990 
(1) 
 
 
The Gini 
coefficient 
for income  
1996-1999 
(2)  
 
 
The Gini 
coefficient for 
earnings 
1989  
(3) 
 
 
The Gini 
coefficient for 
earnings 1997-
2000 
(4) 
 
Armenia .27 .59 .26 .49 
Azerbaijan .33 .30 .27 .51 
Georgia .29 .43 .30 .50 
Kyrgyzstan .31 .47 .26 .47 
Moldova .27 .42 .25 .39 
Tajikistan .28 .47 .27 N/A 
Uzbekistan .30 N/A .26 N/A 
Average CIS-7 .29 .45 .27 .47 
Average the western 
republics of the former  
USSR1 
.24 .37   
Average the Baltic 
republics of the former 
USSR 2 
.24 .34   
Average the former 
USSR 
.27    
Notes: 1 The western republics of the former USSR include: Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine. 2 The Baltic republics of the former USSR include: Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. N/A means data are not available. Sources: Falkingham (2003, 
2004), Fox (2003) and calculations of authors. 
Habibov and Fan   
Currents: New Scholarship in Human Service 
Volume 6, Number 1, 2007 
6 
small proportion can benefit from the growth. Therefore, poverty cannot be 
alleviated even with a high level of economic development (Wodon & Yitzhaki, 
2003). 
 
Financial Constraints 
 
Another consequence of economic depression has been tough financial 
constraints for all CIS-7 countries. Because of the shrinking of GDP and 
government revenues, governments have had to cut public expenditures for 
social programs. As a result, CIS-7 countries have less to spend for social 
programs than other countries of the former USSR (see Table 3). 
Countries of CIS-7 lag behind their former allies in terms of social spending 
as percentage of GDP. For example, the former Baltic countries spend about 12 
percent of GDP on social programs while average spending for social programs 
for the all former USSR countries exceeds 8 percent. By contrast, the average 
spending for social programs in CIS-7 countries is about 6 percent. The same 
picture can be observed in the spending for social program in US dollars per 
capita. While the former Baltic republics spend on average, about $390 per 
capita for social programs, countries of CIS-7 spend only $30 per capita. It is 
remarkable that Tajikistan, the poorest country in CIS-7, spends only $3.68 per 
capita for social programs. 
 
Table 3: Expenditures for social programs in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union in 2000 
 
Countries 
 
 
 
 
Public spending for 
social programs as 
percentage of GDP 
 
 
Public spending for 
social programs in 
USD per capita 
Armenia 5.2 33.28 
Azerbaijan 5.3 34.30 
Georgia 4.3 29.80 
Kyrgyzstan 6.1 17.15 
Moldova 11.0 43.25 
Tajikistan 2.3 3.68 
Uzbekistan 9.8 53.43 
Average CIS-7 6.3 30.70 
Average the western republics 
of the former USSR1 
7.8 56.7 
Average the Baltic republics of 
the former USSR 2 
12.1 390.0 
Average the former USSR 
 
8.3 
 
117.74 
 
Notes: 1 The western republics of the former USSR include: Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine. 2 The Baltic republics of the former USSR include: Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Sources: World Bank (2003a) and calculations of authors. 
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This shortage of funds affects not only the level of benefits provided to the 
population but also the quality of social assistance programs. Social assistance 
offices are dilapidated, social assistance personnel are among the lowest paid 
state employees, and social assistance administrations have only rudimentary 
equipment. For example, although all social assistance offices in Azerbaijan 
have computers, usually Pentium Is, only 60 percent of them have internet 
access and none of them have local networking or specialized database 
software (UNDP, 2004). Consequently, these computers are primarily used for 
typing. 
 
Low Administrative Capacity 
 
Apart from the shortage of money, the lack of administrative capacity is another 
significant factor that negatively affects social assistance. The former Soviet 
Union was a federal state and the responsibilities to design and assess social 
programs were laid upon the central bureaucracy in Moscow. After 
independence, CIS-7 countries did not have experienced personnel to plan and 
evaluate social programs. Additionally, previous experience in administering 
social assistance became almost obsolete during the transition. Two factors 
assisted the provision of social assistance in the past: the homogenous nature 
of poverty and the uncomplicated verification of income. During Soviet times, 
poverty was homogenous: the majority of the poor in the former USSR were 
pensioners, families with large number of dependents, and single mothers 
(Braithwaite, 1995). The homogenous nature of poverty allowed for social 
assistance based on categorical targeting through easily observable 
demographic characteristics such as age and number of children. On the other 
hand, in a centrally-planned economy where everybody worked for the 
government income was easily verified and social assistance was provided to 
the most needy. Since the transition began, poverty has become more diffuse 
and demographic characteristics have become weaker determinants of poverty 
(Braithwaite et al., 2000). Nowadays, poverty is more dependent on size and 
quality of land plot, access to water, possession of agricultural equipment, 
remittance from relatives living in other countries, type of job (government vs. 
private), sector of employment, and participation in the informal economy. In 
addition, the significant share of informal employment and the considerable size 
of the shadow economy in CIS-7 countries make income verification unreliable, 
as shown in Table 4. Because of these factors, social program managers are 
currently facing problems that they have not experienced before. As a manager 
in Kyrgyzstan complains: “Imagine traveling along in a car for 70 years and 
suddenly the road disappear…You do not know where to go” (Kuehnast, 2002, 
p.36). 
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Table 4: Informal employment and shadow economy in CIS-7 countries during 
transition 
 
 
Informal employment 
rates 1995-2001 as 
share of total 
employment 
(%) 
 
 
Size of shadow 
economy as % of GDP 
1995-2001 
Armenia 45.4 45.3 
Azerbaijan 38.1 60.1 
Georgia 41.5 66.1 
Kyrgyzstan 59.2 39.4 
Moldova 31.1 44.1 
Tajikistan N/A N/A 
Uzbekistan 39.8 33.4 
Notes: N/A means data are not available. Sources: Schneider (2002) and Yoon 
et al. (2003). 
 
Limitations of Other Social Programs for Poverty Reduction 
 
Social insurance programs (old age, survivor, and disability benefits, 
unemployment insurance, maternity leave and sickness) also exist in CIS-7 
countries and may help to reduce poverty. However, in the context of low-
income transitional countries, social insurance has multiple limitations from the 
perspective of poverty reduction. First, benefit payment in social insurance is 
conditional on the occurrence of specific contingencies such as unemployment 
or sickness. Employed, able-bodied poor, like the working poor, are not eligible 
for benefits. Second, the amount and duration of previous contributions are the 
major eligibility criteria for social insurance programs. In the countries with large 
shadow economies and high rates of informal employment, the number of 
contributors to, and the amount of contribution collected by, social insurance 
schemes are small. As a result, the benefits are modest and many poor do not 
have a history of contribution at all. Third, social insurance benefits are limited in 
duration. Furthermore, as market reforms continue in CIS-7, even more 
unemployment should be expected from further rationalization in both private 
and state sectors (education and health care, science and culture). After social 
insurance benefits expire, social assistance becomes a program of last resort. 
Also, CIS-7 countries have become increasingly involved in the process of 
globalization. Prices have gradually increased to the international level. In 
Azerbaijan, in the year 2004, for instance, the prices for natural gas for 
households increased by 5 times, and for water and electricity by 3 times. Under 
these circumstances, social assistance should play a key role to counterbalance 
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market forces and protect the living standards of the poor.  
 
Rationale for the Common Framework of Performance Measurement 
 
For the proposed framework to be instrumental in social assistance reform it 
must be operationally advantageous for the achievement of goals relevant to 
contemporary transformation in the CIS-7. This section delineates three major 
advantages of the framework utilization, which are directly pertinent to the 
current milieu of the CIS-7. First, the framework allows social administrators to 
measure the achievements of their programs for the purpose of management 
improvement. Second, it encourages the accountability of the government to 
citizens and policymakers through regular reporting of information about the 
performance of social assistance. Third, it provides international organizations 
supporting SA reforms with an effective tool to identify and promote the best 
practices in the field. 
 
Improving Management 
 
Performance measurement is the regular collection and reporting of information 
about the efficiency, quality, and effectiveness of social service programs (Urban 
Institute, 1980). The advantage of a developed set of performance measures is 
that it permits politicians, social program administrators, and the general public 
to examine the activities of programs in multiple ways (Poister, 2003). First, it 
allows for the assessment and comparison of program performance over time by 
accumulating time-series data about the performance indicators. Second, it 
allows for the assessment of the actual performance of programs against the 
program goals, budgetary targets, and public expectations. Finally, it permits the 
comparison of the performance of different social assistance programs on the 
national level as well as between regions and operating units. Information about 
performance measures is commonly used in six major ways: evaluating the 
general performance of a public agency, monitoring and controlling day-to-day 
operations of the agency, enhancing budgeting and financial procedures, 
motivating subordinates through providing achievable goals, and allowing the 
agency to learn what is working and what not (Behn, 2003). Currently, 
performance measurement for public programs has become a dominant theme 
for public service improvement in developing and transition countries (Balogun, 
2002; Chan, 2001; Jones, 2000). Recent studies show that regular assessment 
of performance increases the incentives for institutions administering social 
assistance programs in developing and transitional countries (Chagin & Struyk, 
2004; Neubourg, 2002). 
 
Encouraging Accountability 
 
Apart from internal purposes of management, performance measurement is 
commonly used for the external purpose of accountability in public services. 
Ensuring accountability is particularly important for low-income transitional 
countries where the population often bitterly complains that governments 
abandoned the provision of social assistance and that funds for SA programs 
are being spent inefficiently and without visible results (Kanbur, 2002). As a 
respondent in a Kyrgyzstan survey noticed, “We are paying taxes but we do not 
know where they go” (UNDP, 2001, p.21). Performance measurement is a 
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priority tool to provide objective information about organization activities to 
various constituencies in a broader framework of establishing accountability. 
The information about the performance of social assistance programs provided 
by the proposed framework will encourage open debates and promote active 
citizen engagement in the problems of social assistance reforms. Easily 
comprehended performance data can also be used by mass media (Besley & 
Burgess, 2002; Stromberg, 2001) or non-profit organizations (Ebrahim, 2003; 
Mehrotra, 2001) to ensure that social policy and programs are being designed 
and implemented on a more informed basis. As several studies in developing 
and transition countries have confirmed, greater accountability and transparency 
improve the overall quality and effectiveness of public services (Deininger & 
Mpuga, 2005; World Bank, 2000b). Finally, accountability and transparency in 
social program delivery has increased the support base for social programs and 
has made them more sustainable from a political perspective (Deepa & Deepa, 
2002). 
 
Promoting Benchmarking 
 
SAP: Performance measurement can also be used to compare the results of SA 
programs across low-income countries. Performance measurement is 
successfully used to benchmark public programs across jurisdictions (Ammons, 
2000; Pizzarella, 2004). Although all countries of the CIS-7 face the same 
challenges, they have selected rather divergent approaches to reforming social 
assistance. The emphasis placed on different program designs is one example. 
Kyrgyzstan underlines anti-poverty benefits; Moldova lays emphasis on a 
mixture of poverty reduction, utility discount, and child benefits; while Azerbaijan 
tries to reform traditional family benefits inherited from the Soviet era. 
Experimenting with various methods of targeting benefits is another example. 
Kyrgyzstan uses income tests based on measuring the income of the applicant; 
Azerbaijan tends to apply categorical targeting; while Uzbekistan prefers 
community targeting. 
If implemented, the common framework of performance measurement 
proposed in this paper will help countries to assess the performance of their 
social assistance programs with comparable results. In turn, the common 
framework will enable countries lagging behind to learn from countries with more 
favorable results. On the other hand, a number of international players are 
currently involved in promoting social assistance reforms to CIS-7 countries 
through loans, grants, research, and technical assistance, each advocating for 
competing approaches to reforms. The international players include international 
financial institutions such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asia 
Development Bank, multilateral donors such as United Nations and European 
Union, unilateral donors such as UK’s Department of Foreign and International 
Development and US’s United States Agency for International Development as 
well as multinational non-profit organizations such as Oxfam and Counterpart 
International. A common framework of performance measurement will allow 
international organizations to identify and study the best results of particular 
social assistance interventions and, subsequently, to support the implementation 
of best practices in other countries of the group. 
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Proposed Structure of the Framework 
 
An important starting point for constructing a performance framework for 
measuring the performance of SA programs is to take into account the 
contemporary context of SA development in low-income countries in transition. 
Against the backdrop discussed in the previous sections of the paper, we 
develop a definition of Common Performance Framework (CPF): CPF can be 
identified as a set of measures and indicators to assess social assistance 
programs in low-income countries in transition, with respect to poverty and 
inequality reduction for the purposes of improving management, encouraging 
accountability, and promoting benchmarking. 
The structure and main elements of the proposed performance framework 
are derived from the notion of the logic theory model (Kettner, Moroney & 
Martin, 1999; Martin, 2000; Martin & Kettner, 1996). The model provides a 
multistage assessment of social programs from three perspectives: efficiency, 
quality, and effectiveness. The efficiency perspective demonstrates the scope of 
the products delivered by social programs. Efficiency seeks to answer the 
question: “Is the program doing things right?” and indicates to what extent 
products were delivered to the intended audience in a prescribed amount. The 
quality perspective demonstrates the quality of provided services. Quality seeks 
to answer the question: “How well is the program doing things?” and indicates to 
what extent products delivered by programs meet specific standards of quality. 
The effectiveness perspective demonstrates change in clients’ status caused by 
a program. Effectiveness seeks to answer the question: “Is the program doing 
the right things?” and indicates to what extent the program achieves a 
prescribed result.The framework which incorporates the three mentioned 
perspectives to assess the performance of social assistance programs is 
outlined in the Table 5. 
The core elements of the framework are presented in the first column of 
Table 5. These elements are: efficiency, quality and effectiveness. Each 
performance perspective of the framework has a set of performance measures 
and indicators dealing with specific challenges faced by social assistance 
programs in low-income countries (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 5). For 
example, one of the measurements of program efficiency is program coverage, 
for which the framework suggests two specific performance indicators: Error of 
Exclusion and Error of Inclusion. Finally, the framework illustrates the particular 
issue addressed by each indicator (see the last column of Table 5). In this way, 
the proposed framework combines the challenges of CIS-7 countries and the 
major perspectives of social programs’ performance. However, we should 
underline that the proposed framework recommends no hierarchy among 
perspectives of social assistance. The framework suggests that each of the 
proposed performance perspectives plays a particular role in dealing with a 
specific challenge. When considered together, these perspectives provide 
essential information about overall performance of the social assistance 
program. Another important consideration is that the proposed structure of the 
framework is only a template and is not all-inclusive. The countries and 
international donors can add or alter specific indicators depending on the 
condition of each country. 
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Table 5: Common framework of performance measurements for assessing 
social assistance programs in CIS-7 
Program  
perspective Measurement 
Performance 
Indicators 
Issues addressed  
by the indicator 
 
Efficiency 
 
Coverage 
 
Error of Inclusion 
Error of Exclusion 
 
What proportion of 
the poor is benefited 
by the programs? 
What proportion of 
the non-poor is 
benefited by the 
programs? 
 Re-distributive 
efficiency 
Index of  
Re-distribute  
Efficiency 
 
Q5/Q1 Ratio 
What share of total 
benefits is transferred 
to the poor? 
To what extent do the 
programs contribute 
to decreasing 
inequality by 
redistributing income 
from the wealthy to 
the poor? 
Quality Timelessness 
Share of 
benefits paid in 
cash 
Index of 
Timelessness 
Index of 
Tangibles 
What proportion of  
benefits paid in time? 
 
What proportion of  
benefits paid in cash? 
Effectiveness Changes in 
poverty indexes 
caused by social 
assistance 
Index of  
Effectiveness 
How much change to 
poverty indexes was 
caused by social 
assistance as a 
percentage of pre-
transfer poverty? 
 
 
Efficiency Performance Measures 
 
In looking at a social program from the efficiency perspective, one assesses the 
outputs of the program delivered (Paton, 2003; Poister, 2003). For assessing 
efficiency of the social assistance programs in the CIS-7, we suggest two 
measurements: coverage and re-distributive efficiency. These two measures 
examine different aspects of program outputs: coverage is concerned with the 
number of people included in a program, and re-distributive efficiency is 
concerned with the amount of benefit delivered. To analyze coverage and re-
distributive efficiency, we need to evaluate the distribution of benefits by 
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quintiles of a population, assuming that the bottom quintile represents the poor 
(Braithwaite et al., 2000; Milanovich, 2000). 
 
Coverage 
 
Measures of coverage provide information regarding the extent to which social 
assistance programs reach the targeted population. The concept of coverage 
efficiency was introduced by Wiesbrod in 1969 (as cited in Atkinson, 1993) and 
further developed by Beckerman (1979) and Atkinson (1995). Measuring the 
coverage allows us to assess two distinctive aspects of social assistance 
intervention: horizontal and vertical efficiency. 
Horizontal efficiency focuses on accurate and inclusive coverage of the 
poor. In other words, horizontal efficiency is concerned with the proportion of the 
poor who are erroneously not covered by social assistance programs, also 
known as the Error of Exclusion. The Error of Exclusion is computed as the 
percentage of the population’s poorest not covered by social assistance to the 
total percentage of the poor: 
 
Ee = Q1n / Q1  
 
where Ee is the Error of Exclusion; Q1n is the number of poor not receiving social 
assistance benefits in the bottom quintile, and Q1 is the total population of the 
bottom quintile. 
Vertical efficiency, on the other hand, focuses on the extent to which 
coverage of social assistance is restricted to the poor. In other words, vertical 
efficiency is concerned with the proportion of the non-poor who are erroneously 
covered by social assistance, so-called the Error of Inclusion. The Error of 
Inclusion is computed as the percentage of non-poor participants covered by 
social assistance to the total percentage of participants in the program:  
 
Ei = (Q2 + Q3 + Q4 + Q5) / (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4+ Q5)  
 
where Ei is the Error of Inclusion in percentage; Q2 and Q5 are the percentage of 
non-poor participants covered by social assistance, meaning the second, third, 
forth and fifth quintiles, respectively, and Q1 and Q5 is the total percentage of 
participants in the program. 
Table 6 illustrates coverage, and the Errors of Exclusion and Inclusion for 
social assistance programs in several CIS-7 countries. As we can see, the 
programs suffer from the Error of Exclusion, between 70 to 96 percent of the 
poor are excluded from participation in social assistance programs. Social 
assistance programs are also affected by the Error of Inclusion, between 53 to 
90 percent of social assistance participants are not poor. The empirical findings 
suggest that the problem of proper identification of the poor during transition has 
been and still is one of the major obstacles for the reforms. On the other hand, 
the variations in the Errors of Inclusion and Exclusion between different 
programs emphasize the need for benchmarking to find and learn the best 
practices in coverage of the poor. 
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Table 6: Coverage of social assistance programs in selected countries of CIS-71,2 
  
Q1 
(Poorest) 
 
 
Q2 
 
 
 
Q3 
 
 
 
Q4 
 
 
 
Q5 
(Wealthiest) 
 
Error of 
Exclusion 
 
Error of 
Inclusion 
Azerbaijan        
    State benefits 8.2 7.9 7.5 8.0 6.7 91.8 0.78 
    Child benefits 7.1 6.9 7.0 7.3 6.1 92.9 0.79 
Georgia        
    Social Assistance N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 78.3 N/A 
Kyrgyzstan        
    Poverty benefits 31 15 10 7 4 69.0 0.53 
    Privileges 14 7 6 10 14 86.0 0.72 
Moldova        
    Social Assistance 15.8 16.6 18.6 18.2 16.2 84.2 0.81 
Tajikistan        
    Social Assistance3 3.9 7.9 9.7 10.3 8.9 96.1 0.90 
Uzbekistan        
    Child benefits 25.8 22 17.8 12.2 6.3 74.2 0.69 
    Poverty benefits 4.9 3.9 4 3.3 2.3 95.1 0.73 
Notes: 1 Figures under quintile sign indicate the percentage of coverage. For 
instance, Q1 for the State Benefits is 8.2, which means that 8.2 percent of the 
total number of people in the poorest quintile is covered by the program. Errors of 
Exclusion and Inclusion are calculated as explained in the text; 2 Data are 
rounded up; 3Data for Tajikistan includes social assistance provided by 
government and humanitarian assistance. N/A means data are not available. 
Sources: ADB (2003), PPMU (2004), World Bank (2002b, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d) 
based on respective household income surveys in each country and calculations 
of the authors. 
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Re-dstributive efficiency 
 
Although program coverage is a significant performance indicator, it fails to 
account for variation in the amount of benefits allocated to each quintile. If the 
benefits were distributed in flat equal amounts among all recipients, there would 
not be the need to analyze re-distributive efficiency. Knowing who received 
benefits would provide the information regarding the amount of transfers 
received. The analysis of efficiency in this case could be limited to measuring 
the Errors of Inclusion and Exclusion. In reality, the actual proportion of benefits 
received by quintiles is different (Coady, Grosh, & Hoddinott, 2002; 2004). 
Therefore, to further assess efficiency, the proportion of benefits collected by 
quintiles, the so-called re-distributive efficiency, must also be measured. 
Measuring re-distributive efficiency is important because “the more accurate a 
subsidy in fact is in reaching the poor, the less the wastage, and the less it costs 
to achieve the desired objective” (Sen, 1995, p. 11).The re-distributive efficiency 
is computed as the share of total social assistance expenditures received by the 
poorest quintile of the population, to the amount of total social assistance 
benefits delivered by a program (Coady & Skoufias, 2004; Cornia & Stewart, 
1995): 
 
RE = 100 * (Q1 / Q2) 
 
where RE is the Redistributive Efficiency of social assistance program in 
percentage; Q1 is the share of total benefits received by the poorest quintile of 
population, and Qt is the total amount of social assistance benefits delivered by a 
program. 
In addition, measuring re-distributive efficiency allows for the assessment 
of the re-distributive effect of SA, as either progressive or regressive. Social 
assistance is “progressive” if the poorest segment receives a higher portion of 
transfers, and “regressive” if the wealthiest receive a higher share of transfers 
(Judge, 2001). Knowing the progressiveness of SA, we can estimate to what 
extent, if any, the programs contribute to the decreasing or increasing inequality 
in society. To compute progressiveness, the share of social assistance benefits 
received by the wealthiest should be compared with the share of SA captured by 
the poor, also called the Q5 / Q1 ratio (Kraus, 2004; Kraus & Hölsch, 2005). The 
lower the ratio, the more progressive the program is, since more benefits are 
transferred to the poorest quintile. The ratio is a more bottom-sensitive measure 
than the Gini coefficient and therefore is more appropriate in evaluating re-
distribution to the bottom quintile in these cases: 
 
P = Q5 / Q1 
 
where P is the Q5 / Q1 ratio; Q5 is the share of the total SA benefits captured by 
the top, wealthiest quintile; and Q1 is the share of the total SA benefits captured 
by the lowest, poorest quintile. 
The re-distribution efficiency and progressiveness of social assistance 
programs in several CIS-7 countries is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Re-distributive efficiency of social assistance programs in selected CIS-
7 countries 1, 2 
 
 
Q1 
(Poorest) 
 
 
 
Q2 
 
 
 
 
Q3 
 
 
 
 
Q4 
 
 
 
 
Q5 
(Wealthiest) 
 
 
 
Q5/Q1 
Ratio 
(Progressiveness) 
 
Azerbaijan        
    State benefits 24.5 19.3 21.6 19.5 15.0 0.6 
    Privileges 16.2 13.4 19.5 26.2 24.4 1.5 
Armenia       
    Social Assistance 31.8 33.8 14.6 9.4 10.2 0.3 
Kyrgyzstan       
    Poverty benefits 54.0 20.0 13.0 7.0 6.0 0.1 
    Privileges 9.0 6.0 17.0 11.0 57.0 6.3 
Moldova       
    Child Benefits 15.3 29.6 20.9 10.7 23.6 1.5 
    Utility subsidies 4.5 11.5 25.2 19.6 39.2 8.7 
  
 Other social  
 assistance  
 benefits 3.2 18.5 13.2 34.7 30.3 9.5 
    Humanitarian Aid 4.7 6.6 10.2 16.8 61.7 13.1 
Uzbekistan       
    Child benefits 28.4 25.6 20.5 15.5 10.0 0.4 
         
    Poverty benefits 
 
22.6 
 
17.9 
 
21.5 
 
21.0 
 
17.0 
 
0.8 
 
Notes: 1Figures under quintile sign indicate the percentage of distributed benefits. 
For example, Q1 for the State Benefits is 24.5, which means that 24.5 percent of 
total social assistance benefits from the program are distributed to the poorest 
quintile. Re-distributive efficiency and Q5/Q1 ratio are calculated as explained in 
the text; 2Data are rounded up. Sources: CISR (2003), GoAz (2004), World Bank 
(2003c; 2003d, 2003e) based on respective household income surveys in each 
country and calculations of the authors. 
As we see from the table, the differences in re-distributive efficiency 
between countries and programs in the panel are extraordinary. In Kyrgyzstan, 
for example, the poorest quintile receives about 54 percent of all the poverty 
benefits, but only 9 percent of the privileges. In Moldova, on the other hand, the 
poor receive about 15 percent of the child benefits, but only about 5 percent of 
the utility subsidies. The last column in Table 7 shows Q5/Q1 ratio for social 
assistance programs in several CIS-7 countries. Again, as in the case of re-
distributive efficiency, we notice great variation in progressiveness of social 
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programs. The poverty benefits in Kyrgyzstan demonstrate the highest 
progressiveness with the ratio equal to 0.1, while Moldova’s humanitarian aid 
reveals the lowest progressiveness, received primarily by the top quintiles of the 
population (the ratio is equal to 13.1). These findings highlight the differences 
between social assistance programs; some programs are progressive, as they 
transfer the majority of the benefits to the poor and therefore decrease existing 
poverty and narrow the income gap between the poor and wealthy.  Other 
programs are regressive, as they transfer a larger proportion of the benefits to 
the wealthiest and therefore reinforce existing poverty and inequality. 
 
Quality Performance Measures 
  
Quality in social services can be defined as outputs with quality dimensions 
(Austin, 2002; Kettner, 2001). The development of quality measurements 
involves attaching quality dimensions such as reliability or timeliness to existing 
program outputs. Studies in total quality management identify and discuss a 
universe of the most commonly recognized quality dimensions in social services 
delivery (Martin, 1993; Moullin, 2002). For assessing quality, we suggest two 
measures particularly relevant to the social assistance programs in the CIS-7: 
timeliness in benefits payments and amount of cash payments. 
 
Reliability 
 
One of the negative phenomena of the contemporary social assistance systems 
in CIS-7 countries is arrears in payments of social assistance benefits. 
Researchers have identified the delay in transfer payments as one of the 
primary complaints about the quality of delivered programs in almost all low-
income transitional countries (CC, 2002; Dudwick, 1999; Dudwick, Gomart, 
Marc, & Kuehnast, 2003). Some low-income countries accumulated a significant 
amount of arrears for social assistance transfers. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan, 
total state arrears for social transfers, excluding pensions, reached about 0.5 
percent of the GDP in the middle of the 1990s  (IMF, 2003).  The reliability of SA 
programs can be measured by the amount of arrears and the time of delay and 
can be calculated in following way: 
 
IT = A * T  
 
where IT is the Index of Reliability; A is total amount of overdue social 
assistance benefits as percentage of GDP; and T is amount of time in months 
for which the payments were delayed. 
The proposed index allows simultaneous measurement of two 
characteristics of timelessness: amount of accumulated social assistance 
arrears and time for which the arrears remained unpaid. The longer payment of 
benefits is delayed and/or the larger arrears that are accumulated for a specific 
social program, the higher is the index of Reliability. 
 
Tangibles 
 
Another negative phenomenon in quality of contemporary social assistance 
programs is that some benefits are paid in kind not in cash. The roots of this 
problem lie in the low fiscal capacity of the state during a transition period (Lorie, 
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2003). Since the states cannot collect enough revenue in cash, it has to use in-
kind payments as substitute for cash benefits. After receiving in-kind benefits, 
the recipients of social assistance are responsible for selling these, usually non-
liquid items, with large discounts and efforts in order to get cash. Thus, the 
payment of in-kind benefits instead of cash has a direct negative impact on the 
ability of social assistance programs to reduce poverty. The amount of in kind 
payments is especially substantial in rural areas (World Bank, 2003c). The Index 
of Tangibles can be calculated in following way:  
 
T = 100 *  (Bc / Bt)  
 
where T is the Index of Tangibles expressed as percentage of benefits paid in 
cash; Bc is the amount of benefit paid in cash in percentage; and Bt is the 
amount of total benefits paid in kind. The Index of Tangibles permits the 
assessment of the proportion of benefits paid in cash as compared to the total 
amount of benefits disbursed by a social assistance program. 
 
Effectiveness Performance Measures 
 
As the main purpose of social assistance benefits is to lift beneficiaries out of 
poverty, measuring the effectiveness of social assistance programs means 
assessing the cause-and-effect relationship between social assistance benefits 
and poverty (Hölsch & Kraus, 2004). Therefore, in our case, social assistance 
benefits are the cause, while changes in poverty are the effects of the programs. 
A common way to measure outcomes of social assistance programs is to 
calculate their effectiveness as the following (Beckerman, 1979): 
 
E = 100 * (Ppre – Ppost) / Ppre 
 
where E is effectiveness of social assistance; Ppost is poverty index after social 
assistance benefits; and Ppre is poverty index before social assistance benefits. 
By comparing poverty indicators before and after social assistance 
benefits, the above-mentioned formula allows us to compute the specific 
contribution of the benefits to poverty reduction, expressed in percentage points. 
In other words, we are able to estimate to what extent the poverty decreased 
because of SA benefits. To correctly estimate the effect of SA benefits to 
multifaceted phenomenon of poverty we employ several measures of poverty 
already outlined in this paper, namely, poverty rate, poverty gap, and poverty 
severity. 
Table 8 illustrates the point by exhibiting the relative poverty reduction of 
social assistance systems in relation to poverty rate, gap, and severity. As we 
can see from the table, the effectiveness of social assistance programs to 
poverty reduction in the presented country, Azerbaijan, varies among programs. 
For example, child benefits decreased the poverty rate, gap, and severity by 
0.45, 0.56, and 2.29 percentage points, respectively. The performance of 
Chernobyl benefits is worst. The program does not decrease the poverty rate 
and slightly decreases the poverty gap and poverty severity by 0.23 and 0.39 
percentage points, respectively. 
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Table 8:  Poverty reduction effectiveness of selected social assistance 
programs in Azerbaijan 
Programs Rate  Gap  Severity 
Social Pensions  3.67  3.82  37.86 
Karabakh benefits  0.02  0.34  1.16 
Chernobyl benefits  0.00  0.23  0.39 
Other benefits  4.41  25.44  53.96 
Note: Source: Calculations of authors based on Azerbaijan Household Budget 
Survey (2003). 
 
Data Availability and Capacity of Data Analysis 
 
Data regarding efficiency and effectiveness of social assistance programs have 
already been collected on a regular basis from household surveys implemented 
by respective national statistics authorities (Scott, 2003). After independence, 
statistical offices of the countries of the CIS-7 have utilized the technical 
assistance of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to introduce 
national household (or family) surveys with up-to-date designs and 
methodologies. These surveys have collected detailed information about the 
reception of social assistance by populations, and are thus the best available 
sources for assessing the performance of social assistance programs 
(Flemming & Micklewright, 2000). In fact, in previous sections of this article we 
used publicly available data from these surveys. Data about the quality of 
service delivery can also be collected by nationwide household surveys by 
adding questions about quality of social assistance (Dehn, Reinikka & Jakob, 
2003). As well, data about quality of services can be derived from community 
surveys conducted by local non-profit organizations involved in assessing social 
services , for instance, Aran (2004) in Azerbaijan, CISR (2003) in Moldova, and 
PSI (2004) in Georgia. Finally, data about the performance of social transfers 
can also be obtained by combining the results of national household surveys 
and community surveys as was done for Georgia by Lokshin and Yemtsov 
(2004). 
At the same time, CIS-7 countries have the capacity to analyze data 
collected from the surveys. According to the requirements of Poverty Reduction 
Programs, each government of the CIS-7 has already identified the agencies 
primarily responsible for monitoring and evaluating reforms, including reforms in 
social assistance. As a result of receiving technical assistance from international 
institutions, these agencies have already become capable of analyzing the data 
necessary for the proposed framework. In Moldova, for example, performance of 
social assistance is analyzed by the Poverty and Policy Monitoring Unit 
supported by UN agencies, while in Azerbaijan this analysis is the responsibility 
of Poverty Reduction and Economic Development Secretariat supported by the 
World Bank (IMF, 2004; PPMU, 2004). 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this article we explain why low-income countries in transition, CIS-7, need the 
Common Framework of Performance Measurement for assessing the 
performance of social assistance programs. Challenges of poverty, inequality, 
fiscal constraints, and low administrative capacities have exposed the need for a 
tool to assess and compare the performance of SA programs. The framework 
we propose in this article will fulfill the existing demands for the improvement of 
social program management, increasing the accountability for implementation of 
reforms, and promoting best practices in social program management in the 
CIS-7. The suggested structure of the Common Framework of Performance 
Measurement offers an integrated approach to measure and compare multiple 
perspectives of the performance, namely, efficiency, quality, and effectiveness 
of SA programs, with a set of indicators relevant to low-income countries in 
transition. 
Protection of the poor and reform in social assistance have become 
constant priorities for the governments of CIS-7 countries in the context of 
poverty reduction strategies. All countries of the group have adopted 
comprehensive Poverty Reduction Programs aimed at reforming social 
assistance. Fulfillment of the Poverty Reduction Programs including reforms in 
social assistance has become a prerequisite for further loans and grants from 
international financial institutions. Therefore, CIS-7 countries have a strong 
incentive to adopt the framework and receive funds to continue their reforms. 
What remains to be delineated is how the system may come about. We 
argue that the main avenue for the framework’s implementation is the CIS-7 
initiative (CIS-7, 2004). Several reasons make the CIS-7 initiative an ideal 
vehicle for discussing the framework. First, the initiative is officially aimed at 
reducing poverty and enhancing social assistance programs in CIS-7. Therefore, 
the discussion of the suggested framework logically fits with the agenda of the 
initiative. Second, under the auspices of the initiative the CIS-7 countries can 
share their experiences and co-ordinate their activities in SA reforms. Hence, 
the initiative produces a natural forum for dialogue about the framework design 
and implementation. Finally, the initiative includes major international sponsors, 
which have the financial resources and expertise to support the framework’s 
implementation. Through the course of consultations and negotiations, the 
governments of CIS-7 countries and international sponsors can reach an 
agreement about the acceptance and implementation of the framework. 
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